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HON. DAVID SCHUMAN: We move now from what has essentially 
been a national focus to a more local one with a panel of 
distinguished Oregon litigators, all of whom have not only argued 
jury trial and remedy clause cases, but have fought long, hard, and 
productively about the Oregon constitutional provisions that are the 
basis of these decisions. And in addition to the distinguished 
litigators, there will be me. 
First, we will be hearing from Travis Eiva, who actually wrote the 
amicus brief for the Oregon Trial Lawyers Association in Horton. 
[Then we will hear from] Susan Marmaduke, who practices with the 
Harrang Long Gary & Rudnick firm, Gene Hallman, from the 
Hallman Law Office in Pendleton, and me. So, I’ll turn it over now to 
Travis. 
TRAVIS EIVA: Good morning, everyone. Oregon, as many of you 
know, is unique in that we have two jury trial right clauses. Now, one 
would think that would motivate the court to doubly protect them. Not 
so. Because of the limitation in time, I’m just going to focus on one of 
them in particular. Article I, section 17, was originally adopted with 
the 1857 constitution. But in 1910 the people amended the 
constitution to include article VII (amended), section 3. So that 
section says, “In actions at law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved,” which you would anticipate means the common law right 
that was enshrined in article I, section 17, stays the same, or the 
authority of the jury is just as extensive as it’s always been “and no 
fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this 
state, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to 
support the verdict.”1 Now, to understand this amendment I think it’s 
really critical that we also understand the time and place and what 
was going on [in] Oregon history when it was passed. 
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1 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 251, 376 P.3d 998, 1044 (2016). 
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Words are given meaning by that time and place, because of the 
unique quality of it—as a time of progressive reform, of limiting 
legislative power, limiting the power of state offices against the 
primacy of direct democracy, the primacy of citizen power. 
So if we’re going to be in Oregon, when we interpret the law here,  
. . . we look at the historical context. And this historical context I want 
to bring up here today was not one that was really addressed by the 
Oregon Supreme Court in Horton, when they decided that article VII 
(amended), section 3, would not get in the way of the legislature 
telling the trial court to set aside the verdict.2 
Now this historical context is a story, really. It’s a story that starts, 
maybe, with a man named William S. U’Ren. He was born to 
immigrant parents in Wisconsin. It was a family of blacksmiths and 
preachers, and he was trained in both of those trades at a very young 
age. His father immigrated to the United States from Cornwell, 
England, because the opportunities were so limited by subjugation to 
wealthy landholders. When he came to America, he quickly found out 
that opportunity was still quite subjugated to the bosses, as they were 
referred to in the United States at that time. And so . . . he moved his 
family from state to state to state trying to find a freer piece of life 
that was not so controlled by the landowners. This search for more 
freedom was not lost on young William; when he was seventeen, he 
struck out on his own. He went to Denver to practice law, and he 
apprenticed at a law firm. 
He started getting deeper and deeper into progressive politics at 
that time, and he came to see America is controlled by monopolists. 
And he became afraid—he said once, “God never intended that a few 
should monopolize so much in this country.” He saw the monopolists 
capturing state legislatures for their own selfish ends—to secure and 
increase their land holdings and to raid their state treasuries in order 
to improve their own business. He believed “that all political evils of 
all the cities and states culminated in the betrayal of the people by 
their representatives in favor of the monopolists.” 
Around 1890, he took these beliefs to Oregon, and he started a law 
practice in Portland. U’Ren quickly learned that the Oregon 
legislature was no exception to the legislative corruption that was 
throughout the country. In fact, one author wrote of Oregon, that it 
enjoyed the unenviable reputation of having one of the most corrupt 
 
2 Id. at 168, 376 P.3d at 998. 
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and inefficient governments found north of Mexico and west of 
Pennsylvania. Legislatures represented the street railways, gas and 
electric light companies, the banks, timber companies, and the 
railroads. Corporate officers of these corporations controlled the 
political nominations, the agenda of legislative committees, and 
directed the legislation. U’Ren, now trained as a lawyer, but always a 
blacksmith at heart, craved tools to change this. He wanted tools to 
reinvigorate the democracy of the people so that government served 
the people [and] not the few who were powerful in this gilded age. He 
first came across the work of J.W. Sullivan, describing a system of 
direct legislation in Switzerland. He saw this as a tool to pass laws in 
the public interest, no matter the industry capture of the legislature. 
And with this he saw, in Oregon, the people were taking notice of 
legislative control by the bosses. It was a time that was ripe for 
reform, and [so] he started the Direct Legislation League. Now, this 
league started—[it] sought to amend the Oregon Constitution, to 
include the initiative and referendum system, so the primacy of the 
people could be recognized in the legislative process. Eventually that 
initiative and referendum process was passed by the legislature, 
through some very hard-fought battles. It could take many hours just 
talking about that. 
From there, they started the Direct Primary League. And it took 
away from the legislature the authority to appoint the senators from 
Oregon, in Washington. Instead we, in Oregon, the people would pick 
which senators would represent us in Washington. We were the first 
state to do this. Many other states followed, and eventually, a 
constitutional amendment to allow the people to directly elect the 
senators occurred. 
He moved on to there to create the Peoples’ Power League, after 
obtaining the initiative and referendum, after obtaining the ability for 
us to actually pick who our senators were and not those who control 
the legislature—the bosses, and the political parties that were owned 
by the bosses. And he started the Peoples’ Power League to now take 
more control and start to more infuse the rights of people into our 
state governments. He, with the help of the Peoples’ Power League, 
passed legislation for the recall elections, so you could recall any state 
officers. He passed the Employer Liability Act. Working conditions 
were so hazardous in Oregon. As we know, we’re a timber state and 
death and maiming was very common amongst our employees here. 
But the common law rules (of fellow servant, as we heard before) of 
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contributory negligence were getting in the way of these workers who 
were hurt getting to a jury. And so this law took away those aspects. 
And he also passed article VII (amended), section 3, to instill or to 
reinvigorate the primacy of the people—of the jury—in decision in a 
civil case. Ultimately, what this says is that no fact tried by a jury 
shall be touched in a court once it’s been found. It stays what it is. 
U’Ren put it forward, but he had the help of Judge Thomas O’Day, 
from the Oregon circuit court, to draft it. And this is what Judge 
O’Day explained, “The purpose of this amendment was to make the 
verdict effective, because twelve persons selected from the body of 
the community are more competent to pass upon and determine 
rightly a question of fact than any other member of the community. If 
the question of fact in an action at law is submitted to the jury, the 
verdict of the jury ought to settle it for all time.” 
And all this work of the Direct Legislation League, the Direct 
Primary League, the Peoples’ Power League—all coming from 
William S. U’Ren and his patriots—made Oregon kind of a rock star 
in progressive politics across the country. There was one article—
Oregon, The Most Complete Democracy in the World—“Oregon saw 
that special privilege was the cause of corruption; that privilege 
always works through the agents of the people rather than through the 
people themselves . . . Oregon law, before the rest of us, that the 
trouble was not with the law breakers but with the lawmakers.” 
Woodrow Wilson said of Oregon’s system, of bringing the 
government back and empowered to the people, that “Oregon, whose 
effect has been to bring government back to the people and to protect 
it from the control of the representatives of selfish and special 
interests.” 
Now, when the Oregon Supreme Court in Horton said that a judge 
can now set aside a verdict as long as the legislature told her to do so, 
I don’t think they were taking into account this historical context of 
where these amendments come from. It was a time when we were 
pulling back legislative power and reinvigorating people’s power 
(particularly in the jury, particularly at the ballot box), and we were 
limiting the scope of control of the legislature. When the Oregon 
Supreme Court held that a court can review a jury verdict that is 
supported by the evidence and set it aside if the legislature tells it to 
do so, how does that interpretation survive this historical context, of 
primacy in the people, in certain areas? How does that interpretation 
survive the stated purpose of the amendment: If the question of fact in 
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an action of law is submitted to the jury, the verdict of the jury ought 
to settle it for all time. 
W. EUGENE HALLMAN: Thank you. I’m Gene Hallman. I’ll take a 
little issue with Judge Schuman’s introduction: as one of the many 
lawyers who has successfully litigated remedy cases in the Oregon 
Supreme Court, I’ve litigated remedy cases in the Oregon Supreme 
Court. Let’s just perhaps leave it at that. 
I want to talk a little bit about a perhaps lesser aspect of the Horton 
decision, but one that was extremely important to people who have 
claims, and that’s the elimination of “bright-line” of 1857 as the 
fountainhead of all remedy jurisprudence. Before Horton, it was 
established that the remedy protections protected cases that existed in 
1857. Smothers was the latest case to hold that.3 [The court in 
Smothers] said “the history of the remedy clause indicates that its 
purpose is to protect absolute common-law rights respecting person, 
property and reputation, as those rights existed when the Oregon 
Constitution was drafted in 1857.”4 The court even went through and 
provided a formula for litigants analyzing the remedy clause, and it 
says, “the first question is whether the plaintiff has alleged an injury 
to one of the absolute rights that Article I, section 10 protects. Stated 
differently, when the drafters wrote the Oregon Constitution in 1857, 
did the common law of Oregon recognize a cause of action for the 
alleged injury?”5 Interestingly, one of the first proponents of that 
1857 requirement was the author of the case of Eastman v. Clackamas 
County,6 Matthew Deady, and he wrote as a federal judge—and I 
really like this quote because it so captures his idea of the importance 
of the remedy clause as a more than a prohibition against charging 
admissions to trial, but as an actual protection of the right of the 
people against the actions of the legislature—and he writes, the 
remedy clause 
is not intended for the redress of any novel, indefinite, or remote 
injury that was not then regarded as within the pale of legal redress. 
But whatever injury the law, as it then stood, took cognizance of 
and furnished a remedy for, every man shall continue to have a 
remedy for by due course of law . . . If this then known and 
accustomed remedy can be taken away in the face of this 
constitutional provision, what other may not? Can the legislature, in 
 
3 Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 23 P.3d 333 (2001). 
4 Id. at 118, 23 P.3d at 353. 
5 Id. at 124, 23 P.3d at 356. 
6 Eastman v. Clackamas, 32 F. 24, 31 (D. Or. 1887). 
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some spasm of novel opinion, take away every man’s remedy for 
slander, assault and battery, or the recovery of a debt?7 
Now, his idea that everything flows from 1857 has been rejected in 
Horton, which gives a whole different idea for the concept of 
originalist. [There was a] different concept there because Judge 
Deady was the chairman of the Oregon Constitutional Convention 
and perhaps had some understanding of what the original intent of the 
Constitutional Convention and the passage of the Bill of Rights was. 
But, be that as it may, the bright line of 1857 gave rise to what I call a 
legal subspecialty of legal archaeology. And the most significant part 
of that was its effect on one of, I think, the most important claims—
the wrongful death claim. Basically, in Oregon, the wrongful death 
statute was passed in 1862, so [during] that five years—they missed 
the window by five years with enormous consequences to cases—all 
the wrongful death cases [were taken] out of any remedy analysis. 
And it wasn’t always that way. In fact, the case that I argued, Storm v. 
McClung,8 followed shortly after a case in which the Oregon Supreme 
Court had held that the remedy clause does apply to statutory claims 
such as wrongful death. There’s an interesting argument, and I quoted 
that to the court. And one of the judges said, “no, it doesn’t.” I said, 
“well, yes it does.” And we didn’t want to continue that way, so I 
gave him the cite, and he read it, and he was quiet after that. And I 
felt pretty good about it, but when I got the opinion in Storm, the 
[Oregon] Supreme Court said the holding of Naher v. Chartier,9 
which was the case that had just come down a few years earlier, that 
“the immunity provision in ORS 30.265(3)(a) that barred the 
plaintiff’s statutory wrongful death action denied the plaintiff a 
remedy in violation of article I, section 10, was error and is 
disavowed.”10 And just so that everybody knows who gets the last 
word on this, they actually put it in italics so that I would be sure to 
notice that one. 
That bright-line rule has led to some pretty interesting inquiries. 
The case of Klutschkowski v. Peacehealth,11 we were as amicus, 
looking at the existence of a remedy for prenatal injury, citing things 
such as the historical of obstetrics in the brief to determine if there’s 
 
7 Id. at 32. 
8 Storm v. McClung, 334 Or. 210, 47 P.3d 476 (2002). 
9 Neher v. Chartier, 319 Or. 417, 879 P.2d 156 (1994). 
10 Id. at 482, 879 P.2d at 223. 
11 Klutschkowski v. PeaceHealth, 245 Or. App. 524, 263 P.3d 1130 (2011). 
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anything at all that happened in 1857. Fortunately, the supreme court 
saved us on that one and correctly ruled that it wasn’t a prenatal 
injury, but it was a birth injury.12 We got auto insurance requirements 
such as Lawson v. Hoke,13 which had to do with the question of—
why are we having to deal with this if there were no cars in 1857? 
Products liability cases, such as the first decision in Rains v. Stayton 
Builders Mart,14 which says that products liability action did not exist 
in 1857, and therefore the caps applied to the plaintiff injury. But as 
far as the spouses claim for loss of consortium, that did apply in 1857. 
So you have the rather unusual situation of the primary injury being 
capped at $500,000, but the derivative injury of loss of consortium 
being uncapped. The bright line is not there anymore. Fortunately, 
with all due respect to Judge Deady and the prior court, Horton erased 
the bright line. What does that mean? 
Cases that previously would not have been considered for a remedy 
analysis are now eligible, most importantly wrongful death. Things 
like products liability, things like internet defamation—it doesn’t go 
the whole way in any kind of a remedy analysis. It’s perhaps like a 
bull riding analogy—you don’t go the full eight seconds, but it does 
get you out of the chute. 
So, the court in Horton held that the court in Smothers had erred 
in—apparently Judge Deady had erred in—stating that there was a 
static conception of common law as it existed in 1857.15 The remedy 
protection is now determined by three tests from Horton. Number 
one, a complete denial of remedy, or the provision of an insubstantial 
remedy, violates the remedy clause.16 And that’s important, obviously 
for itself, but also to constitute a further rejection that the remedy 
clause does not act as any kind of a break of a constraint on the 
legislature. Again the old question—does “open court” just mean that 
you’ve got to keep the courthouse open, or does it mean that the 
legislature can’t interfere in the remedy that’s been acknowledged? 
Second, and this is the part that has given everybody a lot of 
interesting discussions, is that the adjustment of the remedy, as a part 
of a larger scheme for the benefit of society, depends on the quid pro 
quo. That is, what are you trading? What are you giving to take away 
some part of a remedy? And of course the Horton case was an Oregon 
 
12 Klutschkowski v. PeaceHealth, 354 Or. 150, 311 P.3d 461 (2013). 
13 Lawson v. Hoke, 339 Or. 253, 119 P.3d 210 (2005). 
14 Rains v. Stayton Builders Mart, Inc., 264 Or. App. 636, 336 P.3d 483 (2014). 
15 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 251, 376 P.3d 998, 1044 (2016). 
16 Id. 
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Tort Claims Act case, and it had to do with sovereign immunity. And 
the court listed these wonderful things that you’re getting in exchange 
for bankruptcy, but it’s the things such as the ability to actually sue 
the government, the ability to sue—have the deep pockets of the 
individuals, if you chose to sue the individuals, stand behind the 
claim. And it’s the primary issue that I see in the very, very early 
stages of this litigation involving Horton—what is the quid pro quo? 
How much does the quid pro quo have to give or take away? Who 
does the quid pro quo go to? Those sort of things. But anyway, the 
quid pro quo has to be considered in determining whether the reduced 
benefit that the legislature has provided an individual is substantial in 
the overall statutory scheme. 
Just as an aside, one of the more interesting aspects of the case in 
the 125-page opinion is the court’s citation to the Kansas Malpractice 
Victims’ Coalition case17 and subsequent cases, and they were a little 
obtuse, they didn’t say, “this is where we’re going to go,” but they did 
say that, they did take note of the fact that the Kansas Malpractice 
Victims’ Coalition declared their cap—and it’s a malpractice cap—
and they declared their cap unconstitutional for the lack of a quid pro 
quo.18 And then a later decision of the Kansas court examined the 
new malpractice cap and said that in that case there was a sufficient 
new benefit to the potential claimants that made that statute 
constitutional because of the existence of an adequate quid pro quo. 
And then, finally, the third aspect that they did was the legislature 
can modify or eliminate common law actions if the common law 
action could no longer protect core interests. This seems to be 
primarily cases where the court uses the “modern times” in their 
opinion or somehow acknowledges a change in basic societal 
structure, and the cases that were cited by the [Oregon] Supreme 
Court was the 1935 case approving the guest passenger statute, even 
though it took away the rights of some claimants. Of course, I guess 
modern times have changed again because that’s now been abolished. 
But, and then, the alienation of affections cases. And so the court 
acknowledged, and has always really acknowledged, the existence of 
the ability to change things, or the acknowledgment that these don’t 
protect the core interests any longer. 
 
17 Kan. Malpractice Victims’ Coal. v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988). 
18 Id. at 264. 
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I want to briefly end by doing another quote [about the] importance 
of the remedy act and its action as a break in the legislature. Delison 
Smith was the first. [He] was a delegate to the Oregon Constitutional 
Convention from Linn County. He was also Oregon’s first senator, 
although he only served for three weeks and never made it to 
Washington, D.C., because his term expired, and they didn’t 
reappoint him. Anyway, he was a delegate, and very active in the 
debates of the Bill of Rights and the remedy clause. And, take it with 
a grain of salt because his name, by some people in that organization 
was “Delusional Smith,” but he did make the comment that the 
[Oregon] Bill of Rights is “something more than a Fourth of July 
oration. To a certain extent he, Mr. Shattuck, from Multnomah 
County, was in favor of a doctrine that the legislative assembly can do 
no wrong, that their acts are to be regarded as the law. Now, the 
history of the world teaches us that the majority may become 
fractious . . . that through the madness of party spirit they may 
infringe upon the rights of the individual citizens . . . . Then, if the 
individual citizen is to be protected in this point in which he is 
endangered, there must be restrictions put into this constitution.”19 
And that’s basically the foundation of our remedy clause. Thank 
you. 
SUSAN MARMADUKE: Well, Gene usually practices on the 
plaintiffs’ side, as you know, and I usually practice on the defense 
side. But we have something in common, which is that I’ve managed 
to lose my share of remedy clause cases as well, including Clarke20 
and Ackerman.21 
I wanted to step back and just say a few words about the history 
and meaning of article I, section 10. To me, it seems to have 
particular resonance now during the Trump presidency because we 
find ourselves having to rely even more heavily than in normal times 
on the independence of our judiciary. It seems pretty much agreed 
that the state remedy clauses have their genesis in Magna Carta. [The 
slide shown] shows the pertinent provision of the 1225 version of 
Magna Carta, the Wellspring, as well as the text of article I, section 
10, at the bottom of the page. And you can see the similarity in those 
two texts. Between the two, both physically and historically, is 
Coke’s 1797 reinterpretation of Magna Carta, an interpretation that 
 
19 THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1857, 101 (Charles Henry Carey ed., 1926). 
20 Clarke v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 343 Or. 581, 175 P.3d 418 (2007). 
21 Ackerman v. OHSU Med. Grp., 233 Or. App. 511, 227 P.3d 744 (2010). 
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was very influential in the United States. Coke was inspired to 
reinterpret Magna Carta by royal interference with the courts. King 
James had asserted the authority to appoint or remove judges at his 
pleasure and to influence their decisions at his whim. Reading Coke’s 
writing today, at a time when undocumented people are being 
intimated by [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] agents into 
staying away from our courthouses, I was especially struck by the 
statement that every subject of the realm, be freed or outlawed, may 
have justice. So whatever else article I, section 10, means, I hope we 
remember that it is a guarantee of access to justice for everyone, 
regardless of their station in life. 
That said, as we all know, the majority in Horton rejected the 
argument that article I, section 10, means only that.22 To paraphrase, 
the Horton majority essentially said, “we don’t need to decide how 
we would interpret Oregon’s remedy clause if we were considering it 
for the first time because we’ve been working on this problem for 100 
years—debating the meaning of the clause, deciding cases—we may 
not toss that considered body of decisions aside.” So although we 
overrule Smothers, we reaffirm our remedy clause decisions that 
preceded it, including the cases that Smothers disavowed.23 
So, what does that really mean? Does it mean that the cases that 
preceded Smothers are resurrected as full, binding authority, or does it 
mean something less than that? I’ve heard some plaintiffs’ lawyers in 
the post-Horton days assert that those cases aren’t really very 
authoritative because they didn’t grapple with the Horton construct. 
I’m aware of at least three cases that present this issue now in the 
Oregon Court of Appeals. There are more of them than three, but 
three are pretty well along in the process, that will shed some light on 
this question. One of them, Lunsford v. NCH Corporation, was a 
wrongful death product liability action.24 The defendant argued that 
the claim was barred by the products liability statute of repose, and 
the Court of Appeals initially rejected the argument the statute of 
ultimate repose violates article I, section 10, based on Smothers.25 
After Horton, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Horton, and just last 
week on April 26, [2017], the court of appeals issued its ruling, and it 
 
22 See Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 251, 376 P.3d 998, 1044 (2016). 
23 See Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 23 P.3d 333 (2001). 
24 Lunsford v. NCH Corp., 285 Or. App. 122, 396 P.3d 288 (2017). 
25 Id. at 125, 396 P.3d at 290. 
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again concluded that the plaintiff’s challenge to the statute of ultimate 
repose was foreclosed. But this time, the court concluded that it was 
foreclosed based on Sealey v. Hicks, 26 a 1990 case that Smothers had 
disavowed. In Sealey, the Oregon Supreme Court had rejected an 
article I, section 10, challenge to the statute of ultimate repose 
because the court said, “It is a permissible constitutional legislative 
function to balance the possibility of outlawing [some] legitimate 
claims against the public need that at some definite time there be an 
end to potential litigation.”27 So, in other words, the Lunsford court of 
appeals panel made its article I, section 10, decision on the basis of 
Sealey’s determination that the legislature can decide that a claim is 
simply not cognizable if it’s brought after the statute of ultimate 
repose has lapsed. 
I’m aware of two other cases that present this problem of deciding 
the precedential effect of pre-Horton cases. One is Rains v. Stayton 
Builders Mart, Inc.,28 which Maureen Leonard argued just last week, 
I think it was. That case presents the question of whether the statutory 
cap on noneconomic damages29 violates article I, section 10. The 
Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light 
of Horton. It was argued in the court of appeals on the twentieth of 
April, [2017], and it will be very interesting to see whether, in that 
case, the court of appeals applies the Greist decision,30 which is 
another pre-Smothers opinion disavowed by Smothers. In Greist, the 
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the cap on noneconomic 
damages violates article I, section 10, and concluded that—as I think 
we’ve all discussed here—the cap on noneconomic damages allows 
for recovery of up to $500,000 in noneconomic damages and allows 
unlimited recovery of economic damages.31 And in the Greist case, 
the court said that amount of recovery, uncapped economic damages 
and up to $500,000 in noneconomic damages, is a substantial 
amount.32 
The Vasquez v. Double Press case, pending now in the court of 
appeals, presents the same question, as well as the question about the 
 
26 Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or. 387, 788 P.2d 435 (1990). 
27 Id. at 394, 788 P.2d at 438. 
28 Rains v. Stayton Builders Mart, Inc., 359 Or. 610, 375 P.3d 490 (2016). 
29 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.710 (2010). 
30 Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or. 281, 906 P.2d 789 (1995). 
31 Id. at 289, 906 P.2d at 794. 
32 Id. at 291, 906 P.3d at 795. 
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scope of noneconomic damages cap.33 The court’s focus in the Greist 
case on the fact that the noneconomic damages were capped but the 
economic damages were uncapped is an interesting theme that I see 
repeated again and again in recent Oregon cases. I don’t frankly grasp 
particularly why there should be—why noneconomic damages should 
be a different constitutional footing than economic damages—but it 
does seem to me, just from reading the cases, that the Oregon 
Supreme Court views them as such. In the Clarke case, for example, 
the court discussed the Greist case and explained that Greist was 
based on the fact that placing no limit on the recovery of economic 
damages allowed the plaintiffs to recover fully their out-of-pocket 
losses, including their expenses for medical, burial, and memorial 
services.34 And then in State v. Rodriguez, which is a 2009 case, the 
Oregon Supreme Court explained its ruling in Clarke by emphasizing 
the impact that the Oregon Tort Claims cap at that time had had on 
limiting recovery, not only of noneconomic damages but of economic 
damages, and really focused on the impact of economic damages.35 
Which, interestingly enough, the supreme court described as “actual 
damages”—sort of implying that the noneconomic damages weren’t 
actually actual damages. 
Again, this theme was struck in the Horton case, where the court 
again explained its ruling in Clarke by emphasizing the impact that 
that the Oregon Tort Claims cap had had on the plaintiff’s recovery of 
his economic damages, saying Clarke focused solely on whether the 
capped damages of $200,000 was a substantial remedy in light of the 
economic damages that the plaintiff had suffered. In fact, in Clarke, it 
was stipulated that the plaintiff had also suffered $5 million in 
noneconomic damages. 
So, and I would just note that, this approach is consistent with the 
decision of then–court of appeals Judges Brewer and Landau, in the 
Lawson v. Hoke case.36 That case involved the statute that denied 
recovery of any noneconomic damages to persons who didn’t have 
liability insurance at the time of a car accident. And in that case, 
then–Judges Brewer and Landau, both of whom are now Oregon 
Supreme Court Justices, concluded that the statute left the plaintiff 
with a substantial remedy, for remedy clause purposes, because the 
 
33 Vasquez v. Double Press Mfg., Inc., 288 Or. App. 503, 406 P.3d 225 (2017). 
34 Clarke v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 343 Or. 581, 609, 175 P.3d 418, 434 (2007). 
35 State v. Rodriguez, 347 Or. 46, 80, 217 P.3d 659, 680 (2009). 
36 Lawson v. Hoke, 339 Or. 253, 119 P.3d 210 (2005). 
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challenged statute imposes no restriction on plaintiffs’ economic 
damages. So, again, I personally don’t understand the basis for 
treating them as having different standing under the remedy clause. 
But the one thing I’ll say is that there is some benefit to that approach, 
which is that it enables courts to essentially evaluate the 
constitutionality of these issues on a statute-by-statute basis, rather 
than, what I think is a very difficult to administer case-by-case 
evaluation where you never know what the answer is until it’s finally 
spoken to by the Oregon Supreme Court. I think there’s value to a 
system that would at least accord statutes some presumption of 
validity, subject to overturning the event of truly extreme situations 
such as the Clarke case, for example. 
SCHUMAN: Let me begin with a quick comment that refers back to 
what Travis mentioned about the historical context of article VII 
(amended), which was right at the turn of the century. The historical 
context of article I, section 17, is also interesting. At the Oregon 
Constitutional Convention, the pro-jury sentiment was so strong and 
so passionate that they almost passed a provision that would have 
given the jury the right to decide questions of fact and of law. That 
was only avoided at the last minute by a provision that allowed the 
jury to decide questions of fact and of law under instruction from the 
court. But [there was] a very powerful, pro-jury inclination. 
I want to talk about some of the nonsubstantive aspects of Horton. 
By that I mean, not the outcomes, not whether or not caps are 
constitutional or not, whether or not they’re good policy or not—
although my views on that have not been a secret. I think that Horton 
is a bad case, but I want to talk about how the Oregon Supreme Court 
decides these cases, their constitutional methods. Now the basic 
general template that the Oregon Supreme Court adopted for deciding 
constitutional questions, in an older case called Priest v. Pearce,37 
said that—and it said this in one sentence and more or less in a 
parenthetical—that the court will look to the text, the surrounding 
case law, and historical circumstances, which as far as I’m concerned 
kind of covers the waterfront. I mean, what else will they look at? 
In practice, that turned out to be a very rigid form of originalism, 
culminated in a frequently overinterpreted statement from Lakin v. 
Senco Products, the first of the jury trial cases, where the court said 
that trial by jury means “whatever the right to a jury trial . . . meant in 
 
37 Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or. 411, 415, 840 P.2d 65, 67 (1992). 
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1857, it has the same meaning today.”38 Well that has been modified, 
and it has more or less morphed, I think, into a less rigid formulation 
where the court now says that it will “identify the historical principles 
embodied in the text . . . [and] apply those principles faithfully to 
modern circumstances as they arise. Put differently, the historical 
inquiry set out in Priest invites us to identify the principles that . . . [a 
constitutional provision] was intended to advance, while recognizing 
that the scope of that provision is not limited to the historical 
circumstances surrounding its adoption.”39 Still, [this is] a fairly 
powerful originalist way of looking at constitutional interpretation. 
All that, I suppose, is fine, but there has been, I think, a much more 
fundamental shift in Oregon constitutional law, which I find 
regrettable and which I find exemplified in Horton. This is part of an 
ongoing process, which I referred to [in] another forum as the “de-
Lindefication” of Oregon constitutional law. 
I think it’s most obvious in the movement from a rule-based 
interpretation into a balancing-based interpretation. Since the 1970s, 
not coincidentally about the time that Justice Linde became Justice 
Linde as opposed to Professor Linde, the courts have rejected 
balancing over and over and over again as part of Oregon 
constitutional adjudication. “Courts exist to serve whatever rights 
people have . . . it is not for them to weigh or ‘balance’ their own 
institutional concerns against the merits of such a right.”40 “The 
balancing of regulatory goals against the economic consequences is 
the daily stuff of politics rather than of litigation for just 
compensation.”41 “There is no agreed common measure to ‘weigh’ or 
‘balance,’ for instance, an esthetic environment against commercial 
profit . . . or the prevention of caries against strongly felt objections to 
fluoridation of the water supply . . . if state and local policy should 
differ on such matters. Such choices are the essence of political, not 
judicial, decisions.”42 In rejecting the State’s repeated urge for the 
court to adopt a balancing test in free speech cases under article I, 
 
38 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 69, 987 P.2d 463, 468, modified, 329 Or. 
369, 987 P.2d 476 (1999), overruled by Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 
250, 376 P.3d 988, 1044 (2016). 
39 State v. Savastano, 354 Or. 64, 72, 309 P.3d 1083, 1089 (2013). 
40 Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercmty. Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 552, 652 P.2d 318, 323 
(1982). 
41 Suess Builders Co. v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or. 254, 259, 656 P.2d 306, 309 (1982). 
42 City of La Grande v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 148, 576 P.2d 1204, 1211 
(1978). 
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section 8, the court referred to those kinds of decisions as malleable 
and indistinct. In a case called State v. Stoneman, the court said, “We 
think, however, that the balancing approach for which the state 
contends is so contrary to the principles that have guided this court’s 
jurisprudence . . . that it cannot be countenanced.”43 Final quote: 
“[G]overnment cannot avoid a[n unqualified] constitutional command 
by ‘balancing’ it against another of its obligations.”44 
Now, much has been written about why balancing is a bad idea, or 
why it’s a good idea—it’s certainly subject to a lot of debate. Justice 
Scalia wrote a famous article contrasting the rule of law with the law 
of rules. In an opinion, Justice Scalia once talked about balancing as 
comparable to comparing the length of a stick to the weight of a 
stone. And I should say that this is one of the few areas in which 
Justice Linde agreed wholeheartedly with Justice Scalia. Say what 
you will about balancing, in my view, and I think in the view of other 
critics, it seems to replace analysis with unexplainable, obscure, 
judicial value judgments. The court will set out a number of 
considerations and then appear to take three or four steps backwards, 
squint, and announce an outcome. 
The balance always involved, in constitutional litigation, an 
individual’s rights in competition with a governmental interest—an 
interest which, of course, has been endorsed by legislation. Horton, I 
think, is a perfect example of how this has occurred. The old system, 
Smothers—and don’t get me wrong, I thought Smothers was a very 
bad opinion, it involves a lot of fancy footwork trying to get around a 
lot of early cases, it leaves many unanswered questions, as I indicated 
earlier—but it does not allow judges to engage in weighing competing 
policy goals. It asks, did the right exist at common law? Yes or no? 
Not as bright a line, I think, as I indicated earlier. [It] depends a lot on 
the level of generality that you’re going to look at the common law. If 
so, is there a substantial remedy? Again, substantial has its 
problems—it’s subjective and imprecise—but the answer under 
Smothers had nothing to do with whether or not the State had a good 
reason for depriving someone of, for example in Horton, $9 million. 
The new regime—the Horton regime—does a lot of things, many 
of them wrong. The first wrong thing I think that it does—well, not 
the first, but among them—is reinvigorating the pre-Smothers case 
law. They’re reinvigorating a line of cases, which they themselves 
 
43 State v. Stoneman, 323 Or. 536, 542, 920 P.2d 535, 539 (1996). 
44 Oregonian Publ’g. Co. v. O’Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173, 178 (1987). 
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have said is utterly chaotic. And the kind of cases that are now 
working their way through the system are going to reflect that. But 
most of the cases that—Gene has talked about the three different 
types of cases that the court tries to categorize the existing cases in—
the most problematic, I think, are these sort of “Type 2” cases, the 
quid pro quo cases: “[W]hen the legislature has sought to adjust a 
person’s rights and remedies as part of a larger statutory scheme that 
extends benefits to some while limiting benefits to others, we have 
considered that quid pro quo in determining whether the reduced 
benefit that the legislature has provided an individual plaintiff is 
‘substantial’ in light of the overall statutory scheme.”45 This 
necessarily implies an inquiry as to whether one individual’s loss or 
losses is justified by what other individuals gain. How do we do that? 
Length of a stick, weight of a stone. 
I think that the so-called “Type 3” remedy clause cases, where the 
court’s going to look at the reasons for the legislative change in the 
common law remedy measured against the extent to which the 
legislature has departed from the common law is, again, a very thinly 
disguised, pure, balancing test. What’s the government’s interest to be 
gained by limiting or eliminating an individual’s right against harm to 
the individual due to the loss of that right? In other words, the 
legislature’s policy objective in reducing a remedy balanced against 
how much that reduction or elimination is costing the plaintiff. Again, 
how is this to be done? 
I will conclude, and leave significant time for questions, by 
quoting, I think, a sentence from Horton that in many ways sums up 
not only its substantive impact but also its methodological failure. 
The sentence goes like this, it’s at the end of the opinion (the end of 
the majority opinion): “We recognize that the damages available 
under the Tort Claims Act are not sufficient in this case to 
compensate plaintiff for the full extent of the injuries her son suffered. 
However, our remedy clause cases do not deny the legislature 
authority to adjust, within constitutional limits, the duties and 
remedies that one person owes another.”46 Well, in addition to being 
fairly heartless, that, ladies and gentlemen, is a classic example of 
question begging. What that says is—and this is something that 
Justice Linde always railed against—it presumes the conclusion 
 
45 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 219, 376 P.3d 998, 1027 (2016). 
46 Id. at 224, 376 P.3d at 1030. 
REMEDY CLAUSE (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018  1:27 PM 
724 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 707 
instead of reasoning to it. The court says, “we can constitutionally 
deny plaintiff her remedy, because the constitution permits us to do 
that.” 
 
